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Abstract One of the reasons provided for the shift away from an ontology for
physical reality of material objects & properties towards one of physical structures
& relations (Ontological Structural Realism: OntSR) is that the quantum-mechanical
description of composite physical systems of similar elementary particles entails they
are indiscernible. As material objects, they ‘whither away’, and when they wither
away, structures emerge in their stead. We inquire into the question whether recent
results establishing the weak discernibility of elementary particles pose a threat for
this quantum-mechanical reason for OntSR, because precisely their newly discovered
discernibility prevents them from ‘whithering away’. We argue there is a straightfor-
ward manner to consider the recent results as a reason in favour of OntSR rather than
against it.
Keywords Quantum mechanics · Structural realism · Identical particles
1 Whither elementary particles?
According to our best scientifically informed philosophical views, everything in the
universe, from the body of Albert Einstein to the brain of Angelina Jolie and from
the music of Friedrich Nietzsche to the ideas of Igor Strawinsky, ultimately either
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consists of or supervenes on pieces of interacting matter. Without interacting matter
there would be nothing, perhaps not even space–time. According to our best scientific
theories, every piece of interacting matter in the universe is composed of elementary
particles, ultimately quarks, leptons and gauge bosons. Hence everything in the uni-
verse ultimately either consist of or supervenes on elementary particles. This makes
elementary particles truly and uniquely fundamental.
According to quantum mechanics (QM), elementary particles are unlike tiny indi-
visible pieces of rigid matter in motion, occupying a definite location at every instant
of time, colliding with other particles. This much is pretty certain. In good Popperian
spirit, we definitely know what an elementary particle is not.
But, then, what are elementary particles? What are they like? We want to know
this.
QM tells us more, if only a little: elementary particles possess some properties,
such as mass, charge and magnitude of spin. All other properties are however denied
to them, unless we perform measurements on them. Just after measurements are per-
formed on them, in the laboratory, they acquire some additional properties. But only
for a split second. After measurements have ended, the properties pop out of existence
again. And they pop back into existence upon measurement and only upon measure-
ment, unpredictably. Elementary particles are somewhat like colourless, amorphous
entities in a box that obtain a shining colour and assume a definite shape as soon as
someone opens the box. Sheer magic. Real magic.
Elementary particles never occupy any definite location. They are neither some-
where nor everywhere. Yet there is a non-vanishing probability to find them anywhere
upon measurement, also outside boxes with the thickest of walls, just after you put
them in there and closed the box firmly. Elementary particles behave as if they were
tiny billiard balls in some respects when they find themselves in certain particular
circumstances, created by us; and they behave as if they were tiny waves in some
respects when they find themselves in other particular circumstances, also created by
us. This is called ‘the wave-particle duality’. But, as Feynman knew, to introduce a
word for something does not mean you understand it. They are like little schizophren-
ics it seems. The proposal to call them ‘wavicles’ rather than ‘particles’ to express this
has not caught on, as have Nicholas Maxwell’s proposal to call them ‘propensitons’
and Lévy-Leblond’s to call them ‘quantons’. Admittedly naming is not the same as
understanding, but a different word just to signal that the quantum-mechanical parti-
cle-concept is very unlike the classical particle-concept we once knew, used and loved
is a commendable idea.
When sets of what Dirac called similar elementary particles are considered (i.e.
having the same few properties they do possess), they loose their individuality, as a
consequence of the symmetrisation postulate of QM, according to which permuting
them does not yield a situation that is physically discernible from the unpermut-
ed one. Ever since Weyl (1928) brought it up about eighty years ago and Margenau
(1949) emphasised it about twenty years later, philosophers of physics have been argu-
ing that this means that QM refutes Leibniz’s venerable principle of the identity of
indiscernibles (PII); for when we can have composite physical systems consisting
of indiscernible particles, PII is refuted because PII precisely forbids the existence
of such indiscernible objects. So elementary particles are indiscernibles, precisely as
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Schrödinger has begged us to believe.1 After having taken cognizance of this, Quine
overreacted by concluding that “matter evidently goes by the board”.2
When we take Einstein’s insights into the nature of space and time into account, and
wed QM to his Special Theory of Relativity by cutting away infinities that arise in the
process (renormalisation), particles no longer live eternally. They can be annihilated
and created. We can do it and we do it, in what Casimir has called ‘the cathedrals
of the twentieth Century’: the high-energy particle accelerators that have the size
of cities, those magnificent symbols of our pursuit to unravel the mysteries of the
cosmos. By the way, the effect named after Casimir showed that quantum-physical
empty space (the vacuum), i.e. without ‘particles’, is not a void but a plenum, seething
with fluctuations; when you accelerate a ‘particle-detector’ through empty space, it
registers something, as Unruh first demonstrated—presumably it detects so-called
Rindler quanta.3 Long before talk of virtual reality became common, virtual elemen-
tary particles swarmed the stage of physics, in a limbo between definite existence
and definite non-existence that still no one understands. And when elementary par-
ticles are localised somewhere, in space, at some point in time, upon measurement
in a laboratory, they are not localised anywhere according to someone who happens
to drive by the laboratory on her bicycle—for localisation is not Lorentz-invariant,
as Wigner pointed out long ago. Bafflingly, a quantum theory of localisable particles
in Minkowski space–time turns out to be mathematically impossible altogether, as
Malament demonstrated.4 The marriage between QM and the Special Theory of Rel-
ativity seems the death-knell of the already meagre quantum-mechanical concept of
a particle.
If these quantum-physical considerations do not make a case for a drastic revision
of our fundamental ontology of material objects with properties, then we may safely
predict that nothing will ever make such a case.5 At the truly and uniquely fundamental
level of physical reality, there are no individual material objects with properties and
relations that derive from properties. There are no individuals. There are no absolute
discernibles. Let’s face it, indiscernible objects are no objects at all. Identity condi-
tions break down. No identity, no entity. Quantification breaks down. We can talk no
more—and if someone wants to keep talking of physical objects nonetheless, then
he must kiss standard mathematics and classical logic goodbye, must embrace an
entirely different set-theory and logic, as Dalla Chiara, Di Franca, French and others
have known for a while.6
All in all, elementary particles as material objects whither away. For whom science
matters, every thing must go. What will replace them?
1 Weyl (1928, iv.c. § 9), Margenau (1949), Schrödinger (1996, p. 122), French (1989), French and Redhead
(1988), Redhead and Teller (1992), Castellani and Mittelstaedt (2000), French and Ladyman (2003), French
(2006).
2 Quine (1976b, p. 499).
3 See Redhead (1995).
4 See Malament (1992), Halvorson and Clifton (2002).
5 We therefore disagree with Chakravartty (2003), who dares to claim that the quantum-physical consider-
ations provide insufficient ground for rejecting a fundamental ontology of material objects and properties.
6 See their contributions in Castellani (1998).
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Enter ontological structural realism. Elementary particles are structures. At the
truly and uniquely fundamental level of physical reality there are only structures.
Structures drive on relations. If structures have properties, these properties derive
from relations. ‘Particles’ are no more than placeholders in structures. They don’t
really exist. Only structures exist. Schrödinger: “Some philosophers of the past, if the
case could be put to them, would say that the modern atom consists of no stuff at all
but is pure shape.”7
So the ontological structural realist lives happily ever after? Not so fast. Recently
his happiness has come under threat. But before we expound the threat (Sect. 3) and
try to allay it (Sect. 4), we first need to get clear on the relation between scientific
realism and the metaphysical thesis of ontological structural realism, which we just
introduced in passing (Sect. 2).
2 Scientific structural realism
When J. Ladyman introduced the distinction between Epistemic Structural Realism
(EpSR) and Ontic Structural Realism (OntSR), and argued for OntSR, he called quan-
tum mechanics (QM) to the witness-bench; other structural realists have endorsed this
strategy, notably S. French.8 We briefly inquire into their relation to the general view
of scientific realism, arguably still the dominant position in the realism debate in the
philosophy of science. Here is a standard formulation of scientific realism.
Scientific Realism (ScR) Most of the posits of our theoretical scientific knowledge
(objects, fields, structures, events, processes), unobservable ones notably included,
exist human-independently in the actual world; these posits possess human-indepen-
dently most of the properties ascribed to them by our theoretical scientific knowledge,
and mutatis mutandis for the relations between them.
By ‘theoretical scientific knowledge’ we mean the propositional content of all
well-established scientific theories and models.9 The presence of the adverb ‘human-
independently’ serves to emphasise that scientific realism (ScR), being realism with
regard to science, stands opposed to idealism. Whatever posits with their properties
and relations that the realist claims there are, they are there independent of our exis-
tence and our activities and whatever else comes along with that. The mentioning
of unobservables in ScR merely serves to emphasise that they (or most of them) are
included: ‘Most’ in ScR does not mean a restriction to observables only.10 Further-
more, the occurrence of ‘the actual world’ signals explicitly that ScR, as formulated
here, does not is comprise modal claims.
7 Schrödinger in Castellani (1998, p. 203).
8 Ladyman (1998), French and Ladyman (2003).
9 Other kinds of scientific knowledge are not included here, such as how to conduct an experiment, how
to test an hypothesis, and how to apply knowledge for the benefit of mankind, because they do not bear on
the issue at hand.
10 For what unobservables are, see Monton and van Fraassen (2003), and Muller (2005).
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Roughly summarised, ScR says that science provides us with knowledge of the
actual world. A more restrictive and therefore more modest realist claim is the follow-
ing one:
Scientific Epistemic Structural Realism (ScEpSR) All our theoretical scientific knowl-
edge of the actual physical world is knowledge of its structures.
The restriction is two-fold: to structures and to the physical world. The last-men-
tioned restriction leaves room for mental reality; it leaves room for a reduction of the
mental to the physical, for supervenience of the mental on the physical, and even for
a Cartesian substance dualism. ScEpSR makes no pronouncements on mentality and
does not harbour any kind of (anti-)physicalism. For instance, the existence of mental
non-structural entities is compatible with ScEpSR.
Further, debates on and elaborations of structural realism generally have been focus-
sing on physics, and not, for instance, on paleontology, zoology or astronomy, to men-
tion a few branches of natural science only. This is understandable, because ScEpSR
was intended by its modern originator, J. Worrall, as being ‘the best of both worlds’, in
that it was supposed to be a metaphysically meagre realism so as not to fall prey to the
pessimistic meta-induction over the history of science, but still a sufficiently muscular
realism to provide success-arguments in its defence (e.g. Putnam’s ‘no-miracle argu-
ment’).11 Since the pessimistic meta-induction thrives on the history of physics, rather
than on the history of paleontology, zoology or astronomy, the debate has therefore
focussed on physics. We soon join in.
When knowledge implies truth, as few epistemologists would care to deny, then
ScEpSR implies that all and only propositions of our theoretical scientific knowledge
that concern structures are true. Hence the physical world consists of structures, which
exist human-independently because science does not connect the relevant existence-
claims to our existence or our activities—this is almost but not yet ontological structural
realism (read on). Does the physical world consist only of structures? Let us also adopt
Scientific Optimism (ScOpt) Science will, in the end, provide us with everything that
we, humans, can come to know about the physical world.
When ScEpSR implies that the physical world consists of structures, then in com-
bination with ScOpt we arrive at
Ontological Structural Realism (OntSR) The physical world consists of structures
only and they exist human-independently.
Conversely, if structures are all there is in the physical world (OntSR), then all
we can come to know of the physical world by scientific inquiry is knowledge of
structures. All theoretical scientific knowledge that we actually posses then must be
knowledge of structures only; this is ScEpSR.
11 Worrall (1989), who focussed on nineteenth-century physics.
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To summarise, we have just argued for the following
(ScOpt ∧ ScEpSR) −→ OntSR and OntSR −→ ScEpSR, (1)
from which it follows that for scientific optimists the difference between OntSR and
ScEpSR is of little significance:
ScOpt −→ (OntSR ←→ ScEpSR). (2)
Hence debates amongst optimistic scientific realists whether an ontological or an
epistemological variant of ScR should be adopted are without substance. Substance
would return if ScOpt were rejected, but even then adherence to OntSR would still
imply adherence to ScEpSR. Only ScEpSR would then no longer imply OntSR,
although also in that case it would follow that the physical world consists of structures
as far as science can tell, but that, then, there is more between heaven and earth than
dreamt of in science and what is beyond these dreams and inhabits the physical world
may be non-structural in nature. Whether such a rejection of ScOpt is scientific pessi-
mism or anti-scientific obscurantism is an issue we need not decide for the purposes
of the current paper.
Recall that the conclusion of the previous Section was that quantum physics, which
is part of our theoretical scientific knowledge, is telling us that elementary particles
are not material objects but structures. This is ScEpSR; and for the scientific optimist
we then have OntSR by virtue of (1). But at the end of the previous Section we also
mentioned a threat to the claim that elementary particles are not material objects,
which eo ipso constitutes a threat to both ScEpSR and OntSR. We now turn to the
source of this threat.
3 Weak discernibles
Recently it has been argued that similar particles can be saved from indiscernibility.12
They can be discerned by physically meaningful binary relations that are permuta-
tion-invariant; that is, by relations that are symmetric and either irreflexive or reflex-
ive. This makes the particles weakly discernible, to follow Quine’s terminology.13
What is more, these relations are categorical in that they do not involve the quan-
tum-mechanical probabilities. Call an object (in a set S of objects) that is absolutely
discernible—meaning that it has a property that no other object in S has—an individ-
ual (so that its ‘individuality’ resides in that property); call an object that is relationally
discernible—meaning that it is discerned from all other objects in S by a relation—but
not absolutely discernible a relational; and call an object that is neither an individual
nor a relational indiscernible.14 Then elementary particles are not indiscernibles but
12 Saunders (2006), Muller and Saunders (2008), Muller and Seevinck (2009).
13 Quine (1976a).
14 See Muller and Saunders (2008, pp. 503–504) for this terminology.
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relationals. We provide two examples of this and refer to the relevant literature for the
general theorems.
Example 1 Consider a composite physical system of two fermions having spin /2
and finite-dimensional Hilbert-spaceH = C2; then C2 ⊗C2 is the pure state space of
the composite system. We have a set {1, 2} of two particles, having names (or labels)
‘1’ and ‘2’, over which the particle-variables a and b run. There is only a single
admissible pure state (and therefore there are no admissible mixed states), which is
(the unit ray of) the celebrated anti-symmetric singlet-state:
|〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|z+〉 ⊗ |z−〉 − |z−〉 ⊗ |z+〉) ∈ C2 ⊗ C2. (3)
Consider the following physically meaningful and permutation-symmetric ‘Total-spin
relation’ (in units of 2/2):
T(a, b) iff (σa + σb)2 |〉 = 12 |〉, (4)
where
σ1 ≡ (σx + σy + σz) ⊗ 1 and σ2 ≡ 1 ⊗ (σx + σy + σz), (5)
and where σx , σy and σz are the Pauli spin-matrices. Relation T (4) demonstrably
discerns the two fermions weakly and categorically.15
Example 2 Consider a composite system of two arbitrary similar spinless particles
and infinite-dimensional Hilbert-space H = L2(R3). Let P̂ be the linear momen-
tum operator and Q̂ the Cartesian position-operator acting in L2(R3). Consider the
following physically meaningful and permutation-invariant ‘commutator-relation’:
C(a, b) iff ∀ ∈ D : [P̂a, Q̂b
]
 = −i, (6)
where D ⊆ L2(R3) ⊗ L2(R3) is the domain of the commutator, and where
Q̂1 = Q̂ ⊗ 1 and Q̂2 = 1 ⊗ Q̂, (7)
and similarly for P̂1 and P̂2, respectively. Relation C (6) discerns the two particles
weakly and categorically. Extensions to pairs of particles of arbitrary spin by means
of spinors proceed straightforwardly.16
We mention that the most of general proofs do neither rely on the projection pos-
tulate of QM nor on the standard property postulate of QM (a system has a quanti-
tative property iff it is in an eigenstate of the corresponding operator), but they do
15 For the general proof for N > 1 similar fermions in finite-dimensional Hibert-spaces, see Muller and
Saunders (2008, pp. 535–536).
16 For the proof for N > 1 similar particles for arbitrary spin in infinite-dimensional Hilbert-spaces, see
Muller and Seevinck (2009, § 5).
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rely on the uncontroversial conjunct of the last-mentioned (if in an eigenstate, then a
property).
In all discernibility-proofs, one begins with the numerical diversity of having N > 1
named particles (N = 2 in the examples above). If one were to account for this numer-
ical diversity by appealing to the names of the particles only, say, and not to anything
physical about these particles, one would be spreading the smell circularity. But one
does no such thing. The numerical diversity is accounted for physically, that is, by
means of physically meaningful and permutation-invariant relations, as in the two
examples above.
Let us now see how these results bear on OntSR.
4 The second underdetermination thesis
The French-Ladyman argument in favour of OntSR based on QM runs as follows.17
According to QM, an ontology of the truly and uniquely fundamental level of phys-
ical reality consisting of physical individuals must go, because similar elementary
particles are indiscernible and indiscernibles are not individuals, they are not individ-
ual objects. Then, when you want to be realist with regard to QM (ScR), you better
become a ontological structural realist (OntSR). But we have just seen that elementary
particles are weakly discernible, their absolute indiscernibility notwithstanding. We
have discernibles after all. This blocks the inference to OntSR for the scientific realist
(ScR) it seems.
More broadly speaking, consider the
Second Under-determination Thesis (2UT) Every scientific theory under-determines
every specific metaphysical view of that part of the world the theory is about; in other
words, every scientific theory has limited ontological content.18
The adjective ‘specific’ is to rule out trivial metaphysical views, such as ‘There
exists something’, which presumably follows from every scientific theory and there-
fore is determined by it.
The on-going debates about the interpretation of QM provide a shining illustration
of 2UT: a variety of distinct metaphysical views of the physical world can be consis-
tently combined with QM. Let us next also consider a thesis opposite to 2UT, saying
that scientific theories do have some ontological content:
Second Determination Thesis (2DT) Scientific theories are incompatible with some
specific metaphysical views; in other words, they do have some definite ontological
content.
17 Ladyman (1998); French and Ladyman (2003).
18 The under-determination of metaphysics by physics is a running theme in the philosophy of physics, e.g.
§ 6 of French (2006). In harmony with this terminology, the familiar Duhem-Quine thesis about phenomena
and data under-determining theory and model then has to be called ‘the First Under-determination Thesis’
(1UT).
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One illustration of 2DT we have provided in Sect. 1 on elementary particles:
QM rules out the standard metaphysical view that accompanies classical physics,
of space–time filled with interacting rigid bodies having worldlines. We also reported
Schrödinger’s conclusion, endorsed by many others, that QM also rules out every
metaphysical view having elementary particles as individuals. This leaves us with
an ontological dilemma between (i) metaphysical views of the world with genuine
physical indiscernibles and (ii) metaphysical views with metaphysical individuals,
which are metaphysically absolutely discernible objects, each having its own unique
‘token-property’ of haecceitas, or primitive thisness.19 If we count (i) and (ii) as dif-
ferent metaphysical views, then we have another illustration with QM of 2UT on our
hands. The illustration of 2UT improves when we call to mind that we can also take
elementary particles to be relationals, because this adds (iii) a metaphysical view with
relationals. We then have an ontological trilemma in the face of QM, of which (i) and
(ii) seem to point both to OntSR, but (iii) does not seem to do that. In this sense, then,
OntSR seems under-determined by QM.
Nevertheless, there is a way to infer OntSR, even in the light of the fact that ele-
mentary particles are discernible relationals (iii). This way opens as soon as we call
to mind that structures consist of objects with relations; these objects are determined
only in so far as they are determined by the relations that constitute the structure. As
quantum-mechanical objects, the elementary particles are determined by weakly dis-
cerning relations. Structuralist objects, if they must exist, should be relationals. Well,
we have seen that is exactly what elementary particles demonstrably are: relationals.
This leads us to OntSR. Whatever horn of the mentioned trilemma one chooses, one
always ends up with OntSR. In this sense, 2UT fails. But there is more to be said.
The claim that elementary particles are relationals is not due to some interpreta-
tional gloss spread over the theory of QM, but is a theorem proved on the basis of only
a few postulates of the theory of QM, and exactly the same holds for the claim that
elementary particles are absolute indiscernibles. We are then permitted to deduce that
the theory of QM determines (iii) and rules out (i) the view that elementary particles
are physical indiscernibles. Since view (i) motivates (ii)—a metaphysical property is
postulated in order to save the particles from indiscernibility—, view (ii) is left without
motivation, because (i) has been confuted. We conclude that here 2UT fails because
2DT succeeds.
19 Sometimes ‘self-identity’ is taken to express haecceitas. Object a has haecceitas, abbreviated by h(a),
iff a = a. But since the reflexivity of the identity-relation is an axiom of identity, every object described
in a language that includes predicate logic (of course with identity) has haecceitas. Now it has become
literally logically impossible for an object not to have haecceitas; its possession by everything we care to
quantify over has become a logical necessity. To reject haecceitas, then, is to reject tautologies and to deny
haecceitas is to float in contradictions. This is absurd. Hence ‘self-identity’ is not an acceptable expression
of possessing haecceitas. Perhaps one could, when considering N indiscernibles, introduce N primitive
monadic predicates in one’s language, say P1, P2, . . . , PN , and then adopt the following axiom: a con-
junction of N conjuncts of the form: j = k ←→ Pj (k), where ‘j ’ ranges over the predicate-subscripts
and ‘k’ over the set of particles. This implies: j = k ←→ ¬Pj (k). Then we can define h(k) as the
disjunction P1(k) ∨ P2(k) ∨ · · · ∨ PN(k), so that every particle has haecceitas. Then every particle is
metaphysically absolutely discernible. Denying haecceitas now has become a logical possibility: reject the
mentioned axiom, or perhaps even better, adopt the following one: ∀ k, ∀ j : ¬Pj (k).
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This raises, however, a pertinent question: are properties of elementary particles
like mass, charge and spin-magnitude, determined by relations? This question needs
to be answered in the affirmative by the structural realist (ScEpSR, OntSR), because
the presence of properties in structures is permitted only when they are determined
by relations. The answer is provided by the symmetry-group of QM, which is the
Galilei-group.
The starting point of symmetry considerations is a relation between physical sys-
tems: one system being symmetric to another one, defined as there being a transfor-
mation (a map) that sends one to the other (active transformations); and a relation
between descriptions of one physical system: one description being symmetric to
another description of the same system, defined as there being a transformation (a
map) that sends one description to another one (passive transformations). In physics
the last-mentioned usually takes the form of an equation being covariant (form-invari-
ant) under the transformation of the physical magnitudes occurring in the equation.
Notice we then have three relations here (passing over the active symmetry transfor-
mation relation): an equation (which is a relation), the relation of covariance between
equations, and physical magnitudes being related to transformed physical magnitudes.
These transformations usually form a group. In QM the Galilei transformations form
a connected Lie-group, which consist of the displacements and the rotations (they
form the Euclidean group), and the Galilei-boosts (this can be extended by global
phase-transformations of the state so as to obtain the Bargmann-group). The asso-
ciated Lie-Algebra generates the Casimir-invariants, among which we find mass and
spin-magnitude. Electric charge enters when we consider electromagnetic interactions.
These properties of the physical system under consideration thus are determined by
symmetry relations, which makes them acceptable for the structural realist.
Hence OntSR is the tailor-made version of scientific realism (ScR) for QM; then
ScEpSR follows due to (1). Optimistic adherents of ScEpR will also be led to OntSR,
due to (2). We conclude that the threat coming from the weak discernibility result has
not only been allayed but it has been philosophically transformed into an argument in
favour of OntSR.20
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20 Until now we have been arguing with QM against a Galilean space–time background, which is not the
space–time of our universe. We must move to Minkowskian space–time of the Special Theory of Relativ-
ity, and then to the semi-Riemannian space–time of the General Theory of Relativity. In fact relativistic
quantum field theory—which is what one then ends up with—provides even better grounds for OntSR than
QM. This will have to wait for another occasion.
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